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ABSTRACT 
 
Unraveling the Role of Public Researcher Mobility for 
Industrial Innovation* 
 
We estimate the relative contribution of mobile scientists who leave academia for the private 
sector on the subsequent innovative performance of the firms they join. We use data on the 
population of Danish firms and their R&D workers for the period 1999-2004 and measure 
innovation performance by the (value-adjusted) number of patent applications at the 
European Patent Office. We compare the efficacy of mobile former university scientists to the 
effects of mobile workers hired from other firms as well as immobile workers on the 
innovation performance of their employer. Our main result is that mobile university scientists 
contribute substantially more to innovation than R&D workers hired from other firms who, in 
turn, contribute slightly less to industrial innovation than recent university graduates. By 
contrast, immobile workers add little to the innovative activity of their employer. We also find 
that the contribution of mobile R&D workers to innovation depreciates fairly rapidly. These 
findings provide us with three main managerial implications: Firstly, hiring scientists from 
universities is a way of boosting a firm’s innovative activity. Secondly, because hires from 
academia receive lower wages on average than hires from private sector firms, this implies 
that hiring R&D workers from academia may be a cost-effective way of improving innovation 
performance. Thirdly, firms need to take measures in order to further public-private 
researcher interaction to prevent the depreciation of the knowledge stock of their employees. 
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1 Introduction
Innovation has been hallmarked as a source of sustainable competitive advantage ever
since Clark (1987) and Porter (1985). Consequently, management scholars have ex-
tensively studied the drivers of ﬁrms’ innovative performance. A recent and rapidly
emerging strand of the literature focuses on labor mobility as a source of knowl-
edge spillovers and innovative capacity (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Corredoira and
Rosenkopf 2010; Dietz and Bozeman 2005; Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010; Groysberg et
al. forthcoming; Hoisl 2007, 2009; Porter Liebeskind et al. 1996; Kaiser et al. 2008;
Kim and Marschke 2005; Maliranta et al. 2009; Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003; Salter
and Martin 2001; Saxenian 1994; Singh and Agrawal 2010; Song et al. 2003).1
Another body of research is concerned with the role of publicly funded research
as a driver of private sector innovation and productivity. The literature distinguishes
between “formal” arrangements like joint patenting and licensing (Crespi et al. 2007;
Jensen and Thursby 2001; Thursby and Kemp 2002; Thursby and Thursby 2002),
public–private research partnerships (Adams et al. 2001; Agrawal and Henderson
2002; Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Cassiman et al. 2008, 2011; Cassiman and Veugel-
ers 2005; Link and Scott 2005; Mansﬁeld 1991), technology transfer oﬃces (Bozeman,
2000; Feldman et al. 2002; Friedman and Silberman 2003; Siegel and Phan 2005; Siegel
et al. 2003, 2004; Zucker et al. 2002a) or academic entrepreneurship (Rothaermel et
al. 2007; Shane 2004; Toole and Czarnitzki 2009, 2010), and “informal” arrangements
like technical assistance, consulting or joint publication of research papers (Cohen et
al. 2002; Grimpe and Fier, 2010; Link et al. 2007; Zucker and Darby 1996, 2001).2
Related research has hence studied extensively (i) the eﬀects of academia on pri-
vate sector innovation through knowledge transfer and research collaborations and (ii)
the impact of general researcher mobility on innovation. By contrast, little is known
about the speciﬁc eﬀects of scientist mobility from universities on private sector in-
novation. It is here where we aim to add to existing literature: we study the eﬀects
of hiring R&D workers from universities on private sector innovation. We investigate
the extent to which individuals with a science or engineering degree who join a private
ﬁrm after having stayed with a university after graduation (“university researchers”)
contribute to the innovative output of the ﬁrm they join. We also consider the eﬀects
of individuals who have recently completed a science or engineering degree and join
a private ﬁrm after graduation (“recent graduates”). We contrast these eﬀects with
1Edler et al. (2008) provide a review of the recent literature on the international dimension of researcher mobility
and provide empirical evidence that is based on German survey data.
2Canidio (2010) derives a formal theoretical model for the sorting of scientists into university and industry
employees that explains why returns to R&D decrease in ﬁrm size. For university research he ﬁnds that better
researchers work at larger university research laboratories.
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those stemming from R&D workers who either join from another ﬁrm (“ﬁrm joiners”)
or stay with their employer (“stayers”). Our theoretical framework is the “scientiﬁc
and technical human capital approach” due to Bozeman et al. (2001), from which we
derive three empirically testable hypotheses.
What this paper does not do, however, is to compare diﬀerent means of public–
private knowledge transfer mechanisms to one another as in Cohen et al. (2002).
While we hence cannot provide managerial implications for the appropriate choice
of knowledge transfer mechanism — as Cohen et al. (2002) are able to do — we
can derive managerial implications with respect to optimal hiring decisions of R&D
workers.
We are not the ﬁrst to study the mobility of academic researchers. The existing
“prior art” does, however, focus on “star” scientists and/or a particular industrial area
(Almeida and Kogut 1999; Porter Liebeskind et al. 1996; Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003;
Zucker and Darby 1996, 2001; Zucker et al. 1998, 2002a, 2002b); suﬀers from very
small and possibly highly selected samples (Herrera et al. 2010; Zellner 2003); does
not study the eﬀect of scientist mobility on ﬁrm performance (Zellner 2003; Zucker et
al. 2002), or does not compare the relative contributions of diﬀerent types of mobile
and immobile labor to one another (Cohen et al. 2002; Dietz and Bozeman 2005).
Section 2 provides an overview of the literature most closely related to our paper.
We use a unique register data set on the entire population of Danish ﬁrms and their
employees that covers the period 1999 to 2004. We link this data to the number of
patent applications of each ﬁrm at the European Patent Oﬃce (EPO) — our measure
of innovation — as well as to balance sheet data. Our analysis focuses on ﬁrms which
employ at least one R&D employee since these ﬁrms are most likely to produce any
patents. It is based on 16,531 observations on 5,714 ﬁrms.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows: university researchers joining a private sector
ﬁrm have the largest impact on the new employer’s patent counts. An increase in
the number of individuals from that skill group is related to an expected increase in
current citations-weighted patent counts by 0.090 for an average ﬁrm. This ﬁgure may
seem small but needs to be interpreted against the background that as many as 86.6
percent of the R&D active ﬁrms we consider do not hire any additional workers of that
skill group in a given year. We ﬁnd that recent university graduates are second most
eﬀective in producing patents, with one additional graduate adding on average 0.040
patents to the current patent stock. This group of workers hence contributes slightly
more than joiners from other ﬁrms, who add on average 0.039 patents, a diﬀerence
that is not statistically signiﬁcant. Stayers contribute comparatively little to patenting
activity. The patent productivity eﬀects of each skill group are considerably larger once
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we consider a ﬁrm with characteristics similar to the average ﬁrm that patented prior
to 1999, the beginning of our data period. For such a ﬁrm, one additional joiner from
university research adds 0.212 patents. Firm joiners add 0.093 patents and recent
graduates contribute 0.095 patent applications.
These results suggest that there are other mechanisms at work through which
academic research spurs private sector innovation in addition to technology transfers
between universities and the private sector that has been considered in the literature
up to now. In fact, one may consider the results we ﬁnd as evidence for the existence
of more directly measured research spillovers from universities to the private sector.
Existing research measures public–private research spillovers in a rather indirect way,
mostly by geographical or “technological” distance (proxied by diﬀerences in patent
portfolios or patent citations patterns). These studies include Acs et al. (1992),
Adams (1990), Audretsch and Stephan (1996), Anselin et al. (1997), Czarnitzki et al.
(2009a), Griliches (1992), Jaﬀe (1989) and Mansﬁeld (1995).
Moreover, given our descriptive results, which show that recent university grad-
uates and university researchers receive lower wage rates than the more experienced
employees hired from other private sector ﬁrms, our results suggest a rationale for
focusing recruiting activities on university researchers and recent graduates rather
than attracting R&D workers from competitors. We also ﬁnd that the contribution of
academic hirings as well as that of hirings from industry writes oﬀ over time, which
in turn calls for activities promoting the formal and informal knowledge exchange
between public and private researchers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents the theoretical framework of our study and derives our
hypotheses. Section 4 discusses our data set and deﬁnes our variables. Section 5 lays
out our empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses our results whereas section 7 provides
the managerial implications. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related studies
While we believe we are the ﬁrst to analyze the diﬀerential eﬀects of mobility of R&D
workers with diﬀerent employment histories on industrial innovation, we are not the
ﬁrst to study the mobility of scientists in general.
In a study most closely related to ours, Cohen et al. (2002) use business survey
data on large US ﬁrms that were asked to self–assess the importance of alternative
sources of knowledge for own innovative activity. They show that the main channels
through which public research knowledge disseminates to industry are published re-
search papers, formal and informal public–private gatherings, as well as consulting.
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The mobility of scientists to industry plays a subordinate role according to their data.
However, it is important to note that Cohen et al. (2002) compare diﬀerent types of
public/private knowledge transfer mechanisms, among them the mobility of university
scientists, whereas we study the eﬀects of that type of mobility in much greater detail.
Dietz and Bozeman (2005) link the research output, measured by patents and
scientiﬁc publications, of 1,200 scientists supported by important US governmental
institutions to career patterns taken from the scientists’ re´sume´s. They ﬁnd that
scientists who have never left academia publish more research papers than scientists
who encountered spells of industry employment. By contrast, patent productivity
appears to be correlated with public–private sector transitions.
Two studies, Crespi et al. (2007) and Zucker et al. (2002), take one step “back”
compared to the level of analysis of the present paper by analyzing the determinants
of academic scientist mobility instead of its eﬀect on ﬁrm performance. Zucker et
al. (2002) investigate the determinants of scientist mobility for a sample of 327 star
scientists in biotechnology. They ﬁnd that scientists from academia are more likely
to move if their intellectual human capital, measured in terms of citations received,
increases. Crespi et al. (2007) reach similar conclusions for mobile scientists from EU
public research institutions.
Other works related to ours include Herrera et al. (2010) and the descriptive
study by Zellner (2003). Zellner uses survey data on 214 scientists who had been
employed at a leading German public research institution but have since joined a
private sector employer. They were asked to self–assess how important the diﬀerent
types of knowledge acquired at the research institution are for their present private
sector job. Zellner (2003) shows that researchers rate the broader “how to” skills to
be more important than the more narrow research–speciﬁc knowledge. His paper,
however, does not analyze the eﬀects of scientist mobility on industrial innovation.
Herrera et al. (2010) use data on 35 ﬁrms who have self–reported to have hired
at least one worker from the “public R&D system” and compare their performance
to similar ﬁrms who did not hire any of these workers. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms who did
hire workers from science outperform the control group of ﬁrms on many dimensions.
The study does not, however, (i) compare diﬀerent types of hires from universities, (ii)
compare the eﬀectiveness of hires from universities compared to hires from industry
(or any other potentially relevant type of labor) or (iii) consider the number of hires
(it simply uses a binary indicator for hire/no hire). Moreover, the control group ﬁrms
have much lower levels of R&D on average, which may explain the key ﬁnding of
positive performance eﬀects.
Finally, Cassiman et al. (2011) conduct a detailed case study for a Belgian pub-
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licly subsidized research joint venture in nanotechnology, IMEC. They show that hir-
ing workers who have previously been employed at IMEC does not generally lead to
signiﬁcant changes in the innovative output of the hiring ﬁrms. Instead, active partic-
ipation in the research joint venture (“buying a spot in the lab”) does indeed lead to
economically and statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on industrial innovation.
In addition, many of the papers on general researcher mobility and industrial in-
novation (and among them many of the most inﬂuential ones) are based on “star sci-
entists” (e.g. Almeida and Kogut 1999; Porter Liebeskind et al. 1996; Rosenkopf and
Almeida 2003; Zucker and Darby 1996, 2001; Zucker et al. 1998, 2002) or concerned
with one speciﬁc industry, mostly biotechnology, nanotechnology or semiconductors
(e.g. Audretsch and Stephan 1996; Cassiman et al. 2011; Corredoira and Rosenkopf
2010; Dokko and Rosenkopf 2010). In reality, however, only few ﬁrms are in the
biotech or semiconductor industry, and few scientists are star scientists. We hence
believe that our study of the general population of R&D active ﬁrms and the general
population of researchers produces results that are more generalizable than the studies
cited above.
3 Theory and hypotheses
In this section we derive three main hypotheses that we take to the data. Our point
of departure is the “scientiﬁc and technical human capital approach” as ﬁrst proposed
by Bozeman et al. (2001) and discussed as well as extended by Boardman (2009),
Bozeman and Corley (2004), Dietz and Bozeman (2005) as well as Ponomariov and
Boardman (2010). The focus of this approach is the individual scientist and her
individual human capital endowment.
At the core of this approach is the notion that scientiﬁc and technical human capital
is “the sum of an individual researcher’s professional network ties, technical knowledge
and skills, and resources broadly deﬁned” as stated by Bozeman et al. (2001, p. 636).
The important point for our purposes is that any researcher’s scientiﬁc and technical
human capital can be augmented through labor mobility. Recombining diﬀerent types
of human capital is more likely to produce innovations than the mere increase in any
one type, an issue that has also been previously discussed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal
(1998) as well as Tsai and Ghoshal (1998). This can work in a “direct” way, for
example by exposing a university scientist to the more applied stock of knowledge
existing in a private sector ﬁrm, or in an “indirect” way by exposing a university
scientist to new professional networks present and buildable in private sector ﬁrms.
Social capital stemming from professional networks can be turned into human capital
according to the scientiﬁc and technical human capital approach. The idea here is
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that professional networks can be used to seek advice, information and support from
individuals within the network. This endows individuals with additional scientiﬁc and
technical knowledge and hence with higher human capital.
We characterize scientists along four dimensions: (i) their stock of “scientiﬁc” (or
“basic”) human capital before moving from one employer to another, (ii) their stock
of “technical” (or “applied”) human capital before moving, (iii) their ability to re-
combine their human capital with the human capital present at the ﬁrm they join and
(iv) their professional network. We attach labels like “high”, “medium” or “low” to
each characteristic for each worker group in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
“Scientiﬁc” knowledge which constitutes an individual’s scientiﬁc human capital,
is the output of research that produces new knowledge without having any particular
application or use in view (OECD, 2002). This type of research is typically conducted
at universities. “Technical” knowledge is the output of research primarily directed
towards a speciﬁc practical aim or objective (Cassiman et al. 2008; Czarnitzki et al.
2009b; Hall et al. 2001, 2003). This distinction is important since a key driver of
our hypotheses is that each of the alternative types of scientists comes with diﬀerent
abilities to augment and re–combine its human capital. The augmentation and re–
combination improves an individual’s human capital, which in turn leads to greater
innovative activity as argued in the scientiﬁc and technical human capital approach.3
Hoisl (2007, 2009), Giuri et al. (2007) and Va¨a¨na¨nen (2010) document a positive
relationship between human capital and innovative activity — better educated and
more experienced R&D workers generate more innovations.
The main dimensions along which we characterize our diﬀerent types of labor,
university researchers, graduates, ﬁrm joiners and stayers, are the stock of technical
human capital, the stock of scientiﬁc human capital, the type of the professional
network workers command over and an R&D worker’s ability to augment and re–
combine her human capital through labor mobility.
University researchers possess the highest level of recent scientiﬁc human capital
(Gambardella et al. 2008; Giuri et al. 2007; Kaiser 2006). These workers are likely to
bring substantial and perhaps cutting edge basic research knowledge to their new em-
ployer which is beyond that of textbooks and even beyond recently published scientiﬁc
articles (Meyer–Krahmer and Schmoch 1998; Murray 2002; Kaufmann and Todtling
2001; Lam 2005). In addition, they will also know how to put this recent scientiﬁc
knowledge into practice since they are endowed with the necessary tacit knowledge.
They may also provide some additional technical knowledge on how to run research
3Murray (2002) provides an empirical example for the biomedicine industry.
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projects and how to run laboratories (Zellner 2003). They are, however, not used to
private sector working habits and its focus on commercializable applied research, which
is why we assume that their technical human capital is modest. Their professional
network will primarily consist of fellow university scientists.
Given the comparative weakness of joiners from universities in applied research
and given that a private sector ﬁrm’s research agenda has a focus on applied research,
university researchers have the highest chance of all skill groups to successfully aug-
ment their present human capital (primarily scientiﬁc) with complementary technical
human capital through moving to a private sector employer, as ﬁrst evidenced by
Zucker et al. (1998). The same is true for their ability to augment their primarily
science–oriented professional network by a professional network that is generated in a
private sector working environment (Bozeman et al. 2001; Bozeman and Corley 2004;
Dietz and Bozeman 2005). The ability to augment both professional network and own
human capital is hence particularly high for university researchers.
Recent graduates also add scientiﬁc human capital to their new employer. There is,
however, a likely qualitative diﬀerence between university researchers and recent grad-
uates since the former are more likely to have performed their research independently
whereas recent graduates are primarily exposed to basic research through supervised
thesis work and research assistance (Behrens and Gray 2001; Bozeman and Corley
2004; Kyvik and Smeby 1994). Graduate joiners are also likely to possess less tech-
nical human capital given their more indirect exposure to research. The professional
network graduates command over is likely to be the smallest of all worker groups we
consider since graduates are relatively young (which we document in Subsection 4.4).
The type of network will, however, not be very diﬀerent from that of university re-
searchers, given the focus on scientiﬁc research. Like university researchers, graduates
appear to have a high ability to augment both their professional network and their
human capital through labor mobility.
Firm joiners have already been working in an application–oriented environment
before moving. They will hence add little scientiﬁc human capital but will bring in
substantial technical human capital (Zucker et al. 1998) by, for example, adding in a
diﬀerent research agenda and possibly diﬀerent “routines and habits” as pointed out
by Dokko et al. (2009).4 Firm joiners will also diﬀer from the workers employed at
the ﬁrm they join with respect to their professional network. It is not the type of
networks that diﬀers — they will both be oriented towards applied research — rather
their networks allow them to connect to diﬀerent individuals. These diﬀerences in
routines and work habits as well as in the professional networks open up possibilities
4Diﬀerences in routines and habits are extensively studied in the management literature (Almeida et al. 2003;
Adkins 1995; Beyer and Hannah 2002; Gioia and Poole 1984; Higgins 2001; Rao and Drazin 2002).
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for re–combination due to mobility (Bozeman et al. 2001; Bozeman and Corley 2004).
These possibilities are relatively low when compared to university researchers and
recent graduates, however.
Stayers are likely to be similar to ﬁrm joiners with respect to their technical and
scientiﬁc human capital since the only diﬀerence between either is their mobility status.
Both types of workers have been employed in the private sector with its focus on
applied research. They will both also command over a professional network that is
similar in type. The only diﬀerence between ﬁrm joiners and stayers according to
our four dimensions of diﬀerentiation is that stayers — through their very immobility
— have even smaller chances to augment and re-combine their human capital than
ﬁrm joiners. The literature on (inter–ﬁrm) labor mobility cited in the introduction
has indeed shown that mobile workers are more important to innovative activity than
immobile workers.
Obviously, any worker joining the present employer may generate possibilities for
stayers to augment their knowledge as well — provided that the joiners bring in
diﬀerent technical or scientiﬁc human capital and professional networks. We assume,
however, that the stayers’ ability to augment and re–combine their human capital is
substantially smaller than that of joiners because the share of joiners is much smaller
than the share of stayers (compare our descriptive statistics in Subsection 4.3). There
are hence fewer chances for stayers to be exposed to the new workers’ knowledge than
the other way around.
The following paragraphs derive empirically testable hypotheses related to the ex-
pected relative contributions of each of our four main groups of R&D workers on
innovative activity. They are each based on a pairwise comparison of diﬀerent scien-
tist types.
Our first hypothesis concerns the relative contribution of firm joiners and stayers.
There is no diﬀerence between the two groups of workers with respect to either their
applied research stock of knowledge or their basic research stock of knowledge. What
is diﬀerent, however, is their ability to re-combine their respective knowledge stocks.
As argued above, stayers are unlikely to be exposed to new knowledge since they do
not change their working environment, while ﬁrm joiners have a much better chance
of augmenting and re–combining their human capital, which in turn leads to new
innovation.5 Our ﬁrst hypothesis hence reads as follows:
5An additional mechanism through which stayers may add less to innovation than ﬁrm joiners is that existing
employees at the ﬁrm they join may be reluctant to adopt ideas, habits and routines from the recent hire from
another ﬁrm. This issue has been discussed extensively in the context of the “not invented here” syndrome (Katz
and Allen 1982).
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Hypothesis 1: Firm joiners contribute more to innovative activity than stayers.
This ﬁrst hypothesis is primarily conﬁrmatory since this relationship has been doc-
umented by the existing literature on labor mobility (cited in the introduction).
Our second hypothesis compares joiners from university research and graduate join-
ers. The main diﬀerences between these two groups of R&D workers are that re-
searchers possess both a higher level of scientiﬁc knowledge and a higher level of
technical knowledge relative to graduates. The diﬀerences between the two groups of
workers with respect to their professional networks and their abilities to augment their
human capital are less pronounced. This leads us to:
Hypothesis 2: University researchers contribute more to innovative activity than
recent graduates.
Our third hypothesis compares university researchers and firm joiners. When join-
ing a ﬁrm, university researchers are expected to have an edge over ﬁrm joiners with
respect to their scientiﬁc human capital and their ability to augment and re–combine
their human capital. They are, however, disadvantaged compared to ﬁrm joiners in
terms of their technical human capital. Weighing the relative (dis–)advantages that
university researchers possess compared to ﬁrm joiners makes us conclude that:
Hypothesis 3: University researchers contribute more to innovative activity than
joiners from ﬁrms.
There is a fourth comparison of scientist types for which we cannot formulate a
hypothesis. It concerns the diﬀerences between recent graduates and firm joiners.
Graduate joiners possess an edge over ﬁrm joiners in terms of scientiﬁc human capital,
the ability to re–combine their human capital and possibly also with respect to their
ability to augment their professional network. They are, however, disadvantaged in
terms of applied knowledge. It is hence an empirical question if the balance tilts in
favor of graduate joiners or in favor of ﬁrm joiners.
4 Data
In this section we discuss the data sets we use to assemble our ﬁnal data set and
the deﬁnitions we apply to diﬀerentiate R&D active ﬁrms from inactive ones, R&D
workers from non–R&D workers and mobile workers from immobile workers.
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4.1 Data sets used
Patent data
Our point of departure for the data assembly are all patent applications that were ﬁled
at the EPO by at least one Danish applicant since EPO’s foundation in 1978. This
data was taken from EPO’s “Worldwide Patent Statistical Database” which is better
known as the “PatStat” database.6 This data set is critical since our measure for
innovation is patent counts. Even though patent counts are clearly imperfect proxies
for true innovative activity (Arundel and Kabla 1998), they do provide a proxy for
the intermediary output of R&D, are representative for one speciﬁc invention (patents
must refer to one single invention) and can be easily related to patent value correlates
(Trajtenberg 1990). Indeed, patent counts have been extensively used in both the
management literature (Almeida and Kogut 1999; Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990;
Song et al. 2003) and the economics literature (Blundell et al. 1995; Griliches 1990;
Kim and Marschke 2005).
To account for the often asserted heterogeneity in patent value (Harhoﬀ et al.
1999; Hall et al. 2005; Lanjouw et al. 1998), we weight each patent application by
one plus the number of forward citations received within a three-year period after
the EPO publication using the OECD patent citation database (Webb et al. 2005).
Trajtenberg (1990) was the ﬁrst to show that there is a close relationship between
the number of citations a patent receives (“forward citations”) and the value of the
underlying invention. The total number of citation–weighted patent applications in
our data is 4,867. The citation–unweighted number of patent applications is 2,535.
Matched employer–employee data
We add matched employer–employee information provided to us by Statistics Denmark
to our patent data. It is important to note that our data set constitutes the whole
population of Danish ﬁrms and workers, not just a selected sample.
The matched employer–employee data is available from 1980 onwards. Our data
ends in 2004 due to lags in reporting at the EPO and the need to track citations to
a patent for a period of three years. Information on all variables at the ﬁrm level is
available from 1999 onwards. A structural break in the recording of the unique ﬁrm
identiﬁer used by Statistics Denmark prevents us from using information prior to 1999.
To create our data set we ﬁrst attached unique ﬁrm identiﬁers to each of the
patent applicants in our patent data. By doing so, we were able to match 95 percent
of all applicants. The unmatched ones refer to ﬁrms that went out of business before
1999. These ﬁrms would have been lost in our analysis anyway since our ﬁrm–level
information only begins in 1999. Since current patent counts are the result of past
6ULR: http://www.epo.org/patents/patent-information/raw-data/test/product-14-24.html.
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research eﬀorts, we lag all R&D–related variables by one period as in Blundell et al.
(1999). The eﬀective starting date of the within-sample period is thus 2000, whereby
1978-99 is a period of pre-sample information on patents that will also be used in the
estimation as discussed below.
With the ﬁrm identifying numbers at hand, it was a simple task to match the patent
application data and the ﬁrm–level data, essentially balance sheet information. We
ﬁnally match this data to our employee–level data set. The most important piece of
information from that data set refers to the highest level of education attained by an
individual worker and information on her current occupation. We use this information
to deﬁne our population of R&D workers. The employee–level data are aggregated to
the ﬁrm level before merging. That is, we consider the total number of R&D workers
for each ﬁrm in our estimations. We do not use any employee–level data for our
estimation but we do use this information for descriptive analyses.
4.2 Definitions
R&D active ﬁrms
We do not consider the whole population of ﬁrms in our analysis since it is very
unlikely that a ﬁrm without any R&D workers ever patents, as documented by Kaiser
et al. (2008) for a similar data set. We therefore impose the following restrictions
to obtain our ﬁnal data set: ﬁrstly, the data is restricted to ﬁrms that have at least
one R&D worker. R&D workers are individuals who are aged between 20 and 75,
hold a master’s or Ph.D. degree in technical sciences, natural sciences, veterinary
sciences, agricultural sciences or health sciences, and hold a job function that requires a
“high” (professionals) or “intermediate” (technicians and associate professionals) level
of skills.7 Secondly, we condition on ﬁrms not operating in public service (however we
do consider labor mobility from that sector).
The main estimation results are based on 16,531 ﬁrm-year observations on 5,714
unique R&D active ﬁrms. A total of 292 unique ﬁrms patented at least once within
our ﬁve-year sample period between 2000 and 2004.
Knowledge workers
We separate our R&D worker population into knowledge-intensive R&D workers and
R&D support workers based on the skill level of their current occupation. The ﬁrst
group deﬁnes persons working in positions with a high level of scientiﬁc and techno-
logical activity. They are therefore the focus of our analysis. The latter group deﬁnes
7The information on the skill level of job functions is retrieved from the International Standard Clas-
siﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO) assembled by the International Labour Oﬃce. The respective URL is:
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/publ4.htm.
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persons working in positions with an intermediate level of scientiﬁc and technological
activity. R&D support workers are included in our estimations as control variables
and will not be discussed further in the text below.
Mobility
We further diﬀerentiate knowledge-intensive R&D workers according to mobility sta-
tus. We identify their movements between non–aﬃliated ﬁrms and between univer-
sities and ﬁrms. The diﬀerent types of workers we consider are: (i) Stayers who are
employed at Firm A both at time t and time t− 1. (ii) Firm joiners who are workers
employed at ﬁrm A at time t, but at ﬁrm B at time t− 1. (iii) Joiners from university
research are deﬁned as workers employed in ﬁrm A at time t and at a university at
time t−1. (iv) Graduates are deﬁned irrespective of their previous employment status;
the classiﬁcation only depends on the time of graduation and the ﬁeld. A graduate
obtains an R&D-related education in t − 1 and becomes employed in a knowledge-
intensive position at ﬁrm A at time t. (v) Other joiners constitute the ﬁnal group of
R&D workers. They are employed at ﬁrm A at time t and their employment status in
t− 1 is unknown.8 The ﬁnal group of workers are the R&D support workers who are
included as a control variable only and not diﬀerentiated by mobility. Once all the
relevant worker types are deﬁned in the employee data, the employer-employee link
is used to aggregate the information to ﬁrm-level and for each ﬁrm to determine the
share of each R& D worker type.
4.3 Descriptive statistics: firm–level data
Our dependent variable is the number of patent applications ﬁrm i applies for in
year t weighted by the number of forward citations. Our main explanatory variables
are the six diﬀerent types of R&D workers summarized in the paragraph above. We
additionally control for a set of variables conventionally considered as determinants of
patent activity. Firstly, we include the natural logarithm of the total number of R&D
workers. Secondly, we include capital stock which we measure as the book value of
physical capital. Thirdly, we include a set of sector dummies deﬁned according to the
two-digit NACE Rev.1 industrial classiﬁcation. Fourthly, we control for regional eﬀects
and time-ﬁxed eﬀects by dummy variables. Fifthly, we also account for possible path
dependence in patenting activity by including a dummy variable for having patented
in t − 1. Finally, we control for ﬁrm i’s pre–sample patenting history by including
the natural logarithm of ﬁrm i’s patent applications prior to 1999 and by including
a dummy variable for having applied for at least one pre–sample patent. We discuss
8These are persons, for example, who have been previously self-employed, have been on leave schemes, or have
immigrated between t− 1 and t.
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details of our empirical speciﬁcation in Section 5.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our dependent and explanatory variables
at the ﬁrm level. The table diﬀerentiates ﬁrms with pre–sample patents, i.e. ﬁrms with
at least one patent application before 1999, and those without a pre–sample patent
application.
The table shows that the average ﬁrm in our sample applies for 0.153 patents
per year. The average number of citation–weighted patents is 0.294, which implies
that each patent in our data receives 0.92 citations on average. There are quite
pronounced diﬀerences between ﬁrms with and without pre–sample patenting with
respect to within-sample patenting activity: the average number of patents is more
than 30 times higher for ﬁrms that have at least one patent prior to 1999 compared
to a ﬁrm without such a pre–sample patent.
There is little diﬀerence between ﬁrms with and without pre–sample patents with
respect to the alternative worker shares we consider and in terms of regional aﬃlia-
tion. At 63.1 percent, stayers constitute by far the largest group of R&D workers.
Support workers follow with 16.1 percent. Joiners from the private sector make up
11.5 percent of the total current R&D employment on average. Outside joiners and
recent graduates account for about four percent of the R&D workforce each, while
joiners from university research constitute the smallest employment category, with 0.8
percent of all R&D workers belonging to that group.
The average ﬁrm in our data employs about seven R&D workers. Firms with
patenting activity prior to 1999 employ 21 R&D workers while ﬁrms without pre–
sample patents employ about ﬁve R&D workers. Firms with pre–sample patents also
possess a substantially larger capital stock and tend to be active in more technology-
intensive sectors like chemicals (including biotech), machinery and electronics.
Insert Table 1 about here.
Appendix A displays a correlation matrix of our explanatory variables. It shows
that the correlation between the variables is low, a ﬁnding that is also testiﬁed by a
mean variance inﬂation factor (VIF) of 1.67, which is well below the critical value of
10 suggested by Belsley et al. (1980).
4.4 Descriptive statistics: employee–level
Table 2 details the characteristics of each group of R&D workers currently employed
in a knowledge-intensive position in a private sector ﬁrm. There are a total of 95,476
observations on such individuals which we aggregate to the employer–level for our
econometric analysis and the descriptive statistics discussed above. For each year an
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individual worker is present in our data, she is observed either as a joiner from one of
four possible sources or as a stayer in the ﬁrm.
Comparing the age distributions across mobility groups shows that all groups of
mobile workers are on average younger than stayers. Moreover, joiners from univer-
sity research are younger on average than joiners from ﬁrms. Unsurprisingly, recent
graduates constitute the youngest worker group. Looking at potential experience as
measured by years elapsed between graduation and the current period of observation,
the average experience of workers at a ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm move in our sample is around ten
years, whereas moves of university researchers to private ﬁrms occur on average around
six years after graduation.
Also recorded in Table 2 are the sectoral distributions of the worker-year observa-
tions. A few sectors are seen to be very important for all groups of R&D workers. The
number one employer of R&D workers, “Technical services”, accounts for somewhat
less than a third of the observations within each worker group. Other sectors which
are important as destination sectors are “IT & telecom” and “Chemicals”. Jointly,
these three sectors employ between 60 and 67 percent of all R&D workers. Interest-
ingly, “Chemicals”, which includes biotechnology, only ranks second in terms of R&D
worker employment shares and actually comes quite close to “IT & telecom”. The sec-
toral distributions are remarkably similar across the diﬀerent groups of workers. This
reinforces our approach to not look at scientist mobility through the biotechnology
lens only.
The ﬁnal piece of information in Table 2 is the average annual earnings of the R&D
workers. The ﬁgures are in 1,000 DKK (2000 price level). The table shows that R&D
stayers constitute the most expensive group of workers. Their median compensation is
457,000 DKK per year. Firm joiners are second most expensive with an annual wage
of 419,000 DKK. Joiners from university research and other joiners receive around
370,000 DKK on average, while recent graduates are compensated with 323,000 DKK.
Uncontrolled for other factors that may aﬀect wages, the comparatively low wages
university scientists receive appear to be consistent with Stern (2004).
We shall use these ﬁgures on average wage rates in Section 7.
Insert Table 2 about here.
5 Empirical strategy
Our empirical framework is a standard ﬁrm-level patent production function aug-
mented by including our six alternative types of R&D workers. It also accounts for
feedback from past patenting activity to present patenting activity and for both ob-
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served and unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity.
5.1 The patent production function
We assume that the knowledge production function is Cobb-Douglas (Hausman et
al., 1984; Blundell et al., 1995). Patent output P depends on labor input L, capital
input K and a term A capturing a set of additional control variables. Labor input is
diﬀerentiated into joiners from ﬁrms, LJ , joiners from university research, LU , recent
graduates, LG, other joiners, LO, stayers, LS and support workers, LP ; L = LJ +
LU + LG + LO + LS + LP .
The six diﬀerent types of R&D labor enter the patent production function in terms
of eﬃciency units as in Hellerstein et al. (1999) as well as Galindo-Rueda and Haskel
(2005). This enables us to estimate each labor type’s relative patent productivity.
We normalize the marginal patent productivities of each labor type by the marginal
patent productivity of stayers, LS, and use natural logarithms to obtain:
lnP = lnA+ β lnK + α lnL+ δJsJ + δUsU + δGsG + δOsO + δP sP , (1)
where sk denotes the share of labor type k, sk = Lk/L, and stayers are the omit-
ted reference category. Appendix B contains details on the derivation of our patent
production function.
5.2 Count data models
The dependent variable is discrete and takes on values of zero or a positive integer.
The appropriate econometric tool is hence a count data model. The most popular
model here is the Poisson regression (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Winkelmann 2008)
with an exponential mean function as in Hausman et al. (1984).
The Poisson model assumes, however, equality between the conditional mean and
the conditional variance, i.e. equi–dispersion. This assumption if often violated in
patent data contexts (Blundell et al. 1995; Cincera 1997). The violation does not
aﬀect the consistency of the parameter estimates but it does aﬀect the precision with
which they are estimated. An alternative approach, which does not rely on equi-
dispersion, is the Negative Binomial model (NegBin) which encompasses the Poisson
model. Our estimation results indicate a violation of equi-dispersion, which is why we
present NegBin results throughout.
5.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
Our speciﬁcation controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc permanent heterogeneity in patenting ac-
tivity which may for example be caused by diﬀerences in R&D management, diﬀerent
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appropriability conditions of R&D investments, or diﬀerent technological opportuni-
ties. There are two common ways to deal with this problem: ﬁxed eﬀects or random
eﬀects models. Random eﬀects are not plausible in our setting since unobserved per-
manent heterogeneity will most likely be correlated with the regressors.
Blundell et al. (1995, 1999, 2002) suggest a method to proxy the unobserved
permanent heterogeneity, the “ﬁxed eﬀect”. Their “pre–sample mean estimator” is
developed for count data models where the information on the dependent variable has
a longer history than the information on the explanatory variables. This is exactly
the case for our data: The patent data starts in 1978 while the ﬁrm–level information
(allowing for lags) starts in 2000 only. The estimator uses the average of the dependent
variable over the pre-sample period as a proxy for the correlated ﬁxed eﬀects for each
ﬁrm. Hence the key assumption here is that the main source of unobserved permanent
heterogeneity in patent productivity is reﬂected in the pre–sample patent stock.
The pre–sample mean estimator relies on stationarity of the dependent variable.
There is, however, a strong upward trend in the number of patent applications, which
is why we apply a trend adjustment of the proxy variable as suggested by Kaiser et
al. (2008).
In the practical implementation of the ﬁxed eﬀects proxy variable, we follow Blun-
dell et al. (1995, 1999) and include the natural logarithm of the pre–sample mean
number of patent applications per ﬁrm. For ﬁrms without any pre–sample patent
applications, we substitute an arbitrary small constant like Blundell et al. (1999). To
account for this non–linear transformation, we also include a dummy variable coded
1 if the ﬁrm has at least one pre–sample patent and 0 if this is not the case.
An alternative would be to use zero-inﬂated count data models. These models
adjust for zeros directly by modeling an additional process describing whether the
ﬁrm patents or not using the Probit framework. However, this method requires ﬁrm
characteristics that can be used to model the ﬁrm’s decision to patent or not in the
Probit regression. Further, Staub and Winkelmann (2009) show that zero-inﬂation
models are not robust to misspeciﬁcations of the data-generating process unlike the
Poisson model (if the conditional mean is correctly speciﬁed).
5.4 State dependence
We ﬁnally control for possible state dependence in patenting activity. Blundell et
al. (1995) include ﬁrm i’s discounted patent stock as an explanatory variable. We
do, however, follow the approach of Cre´pon and Duguet (1997) and introduce state
dependence by including a dummy variable for patenting activity in t − 1 instead
of the patent stock, since this emphasizes recent patenting activity and circumvents
16
collinearity problems with the ﬁxed eﬀects proxy variables.
6 Results
Table 3 presents three sets of estimation results, our baseline model where we apply
our citation weights and use once-lagged labor and capital inputs, and two robustness
checks. The ﬁrst robustness check uses citation–unweighted patent counts while the
second diﬀers from our baseline model by using two-times lagged labor and capital
inputs. We conduct the ﬁrst robustness check to analyze the extent to which value–
adjustments may matter. The idea behind the second robustness check is to study
whether or not it takes more than one year for mobility to be reﬂected in patent
counts.
The coeﬃcient estimates related to the R&D worker shares as shown in Table 3
do not translate directly into marginal eﬀects as in OLS models. What is directly
interpretable, however, is their eﬀect on patenting activity relative to the reference
group of workers, R&D stayers. A positive coeﬃcient on any of the ﬁve worker group
shares included in the estimation indicates that the respective worker group adds more
to innovation than R&D stayers.
In order to simplify the interpretation of our estimation results, we present marginal
eﬀects in Table 4. Marginal eﬀects give the absolute change in the expected number
of patent applications due to an increase in the number of workers from a particular
skill group by one. Appendix C shows how to derive marginal eﬀects for each type of
labor input from the parameters of Equation (1).
Main results overview
We ﬁnd that joiners from university research have by far the most positive eﬀect on
a ﬁrm’s patenting activity. The related coeﬃcient is more than twice as large as the
coeﬃcient related to the second–most productive skill groups, recent graduates and
joiners from ﬁrms. By contrast, the group of other joiners and the R&D support
workers do not contribute to an extent statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from that of
R&D stayers.
Table 4 shows that one additional joiner from university research is associated with
0.090 additional citation-weighted patents across the average of all ﬁrms. For ﬁrms
with at least one patent in the time period under consideration, the eﬀect is as much
as 0.267 patents: hiring four additional university researchers relates to one additional
patent application. For ﬁrms with at least one pre–sample patent the respective ﬁgure
is 0.212 additional patents. Researchers with a university employment background
who join a private ﬁrm hence have a substantial impact on the patenting activity of
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the ﬁrm they join. The marginal eﬀects of other R&D joiners, R&D support workers
and R&D stayers are not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
We devote the following paragraph to discuss our main empirical ﬁndings in the
context of the hypotheses forwarded in section 3.
Hypotheses testing
Hypothesis 1 relates to the eﬀect of mobility, stating that firm joiners contribute
more to patenting activity than stayers. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the
claim with the coeﬃcient of ﬁrm joiners being positive and statistically signiﬁcant (p
value 0.000). We hence cannot reject Hypothesis 1 and by the same token, we provide
evidence for the consistency of our results with earlier ﬁndings in the literature. In fact,
except for the group of joiners without a known employment history, all mobile skill
groups (joiners from university research, firm joiners, and recent graduates) contribute
both statistically and economically more to patenting activity than R&D stayers. This
indicates that their ability to augment and re–combine their scientiﬁc and technical
human capital is indeed higher than that of R&D stayers.
Hypothesis 2 compares the relative contributions of diﬀerent types of mobile work-
ers from academia by stating that joiners from university research contribute more
than recent graduates. We do indeed ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the coeﬃcients
of university researchers and recent graduates is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
(p value 0.026). Hypothesis 2 is hence supported by our results. Our ﬁnding suggests
that there is a substantial contribution of the additional applied and basic knowledge
that university researchers bring to the new employer relative to recent graduates.
Hypothesis 3 compares the relative contributions of joiners from university research
and firm joiners. We ﬁnd that the contribution of university researchers is indeed
substantially larger than that of ﬁrm joiners (p value 0.013). This provides empirical
support for Hypothesis 3. It suggests that the ability of joiners from university research
to augment and re–combine their human capital and their basic research knowledge
provides them with an edge over the superior applied research knowledge provided by
ﬁrm joiners.
While we can assert that recent graduates have a marginally stronger impact on
patenting than firm joiners, we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p value
0.94). This suggests that the higher ability of graduates to augment and re–combine
their human capital and their better command of basic research is counter–balanced
by the ﬁrm joiners’ superior applied research knowledge.
Insert Table 3 about here.
Insert Table 4 about here.
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Other results
Results of secondary interest are that: (i) The total number of R&D workers and
the capital stock are positively associated with patenting activity. The corresponding
coeﬃcients translate into elasticities: a one percent increase in capital stock is related
to a 0.165 percent increase in the expected number of (citations-weighted) patents and
a one percent increase in the number of R&D workers is associated with an increase
in the expected number of patents by 0.257 percent. (ii) Past patenting activity has
a substantial eﬀect on present patenting activity. The respective coeﬃcient estimate
suggests that a ﬁrm that patented in t− 1 is about 1.4 times more likely to patent in
t as well. We hence provide evidence for substantial state dependence. (iii) Likewise,
an increase in the number of pre–sample patents leads to an increase in the number
of contemporary patents. The related elasticity is 0.339 and hence much larger than
that of capital stock and the number of R&D workers.
Robustness checks
The citation–unweighted results shown in Table 3 suggest that the eﬀects of the diﬀer-
ent worker groups become smaller in magnitude while all other results remain fairly
unchanged. This suggests that not accounting for patent value leads to an under–
estimation of the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of mobile workers relative to other determi-
nants of patenting.
Similar to the citation-unweighted regressions, the twice–lagged results suggest that
lagging our variables of core interest by two periods instead of one leaves all results
but the ones related to the diﬀerent skill groups largely unaﬀected. The worker group
coeﬃcient estimates generally become smaller, suggesting that the eﬀect of the dif-
ferent types of labor on present patenting activity decays over time. The skill group
most adversely aﬀected by the decay are the joiners from university research. Their
knowledge, so the results suggest, appears to be written oﬀ more rapidly than that of
any other worker group.
Alternative interpretations
We devote this subsection to a discussion of alternative explanations for our main
empirical ﬁndings.
Alternative explanations include diﬀerences in experience and education between
the worker groups. If mobile workers were more experienced and better educated
than immobile workers (Hypothesis 1), if the same was true for joiners from university
research versus recent graduates (Hypothesis 2) and for joiners from university research
versus ﬁrm joiners (Hypothesis 3), it would provide an alternative explanation for the
empirical results we produced.
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We ﬁrst consider diﬀerences in average experience as the time elapsed between grad-
uation and the year of observation. Table 2 shows that stayers are more experienced
than ﬁrm joiners on average (indeed more than any of the mobile worker groups). The
eﬀect of more-experienced stayers should actually work against our empirical ﬁnding.
Secondly, we consider diﬀerences in education which we proxy by the average level of
formal education each worker group received (Master’s versus Ph.D.). Table 2 shows
that there are no substantial diﬀerences in formal education between stayers and ﬁrm
joiners. Our conﬁrmation of Hypothesis 1 is therefore not driven by diﬀerences in
experience or the level of education.
When comparing joiners from university research and recent graduates, we ﬁnd
clear diﬀerences in terms of experience and the level of formal qualiﬁcation, as should
be expected. However, both diﬀerences can be regarded as an integral part of the
predicted diﬀerences in the amount and quality of the scientiﬁc and technical human
capital accumulated by workers in either group, and thus our descriptive ﬁndings are
fully consistent with Hypothesis 2. To fully maintain our interpretation, we need to
argue that the diﬀerences in experience and education between joiners from university
research and recent graduates are not caused by selection into pursuing a university
career rather than joining a private ﬁrm upon graduation. For joiners from university
research, there has been an initial selection into university employment after gradua-
tion. If the smartest people went into an academic career, this would imply a positive
selection. This selection may potentially drive our ﬁnding of positive productivity
diﬀerentials between recent graduates and joiners from university research. We argue,
however, that it is unlikely to be the main explanation since the joiners from university
research that we observe are also subjected to a second round of selection: most moves
of joiners from university research to private ﬁrms occur around a level of experience
associated with tenure decisions in Danish universities (three to ﬁve years after the
Ph.D.). Figure 2 shows how the observed movers from university employment to the
private sector are distributed by years since graduation. More than half of the moves
occur within three years after graduation and moves within a ﬁve-year horizon account
for more than two-thirds of the total. This timing of moves suggests that many moves
from university employment to a ﬁrm result from a negative tenure decision and goes
against the eﬀect of any positive selection after graduation.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
We reach similar conclusions for Hypothesis 3. Here we observe that ﬁrm joiners are
more experienced than joiners from university research on average. This eﬀect should
go in the opposite direction of our result and hence reinforces our interpretation based
on the theoretical model. In terms of the level of education, there is a diﬀerence in favor
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of joiners from university research. This suggests that joiners from university research
are able to accumulate more scientiﬁc and human capital. It is consistent with our
interpretation that the diﬀerential eﬀect between joiners from university research and
ﬁrm joiners is driven by diﬀerences in scientiﬁc and technical human capital, a higher
ability to re–combine human capital as well as social networks. These considerations
all support Hypothesis 3.
Finally, any diﬀerences in the sectoral composition of the destination ﬁrms of dif-
ferent groups of workers could be likely candidates for diﬀerences in their estimated
eﬀects on innovation in private ﬁrms as well. If, for example, all joiners from university
research opted for sectors that were already particularly patent-intensive whereas ﬁrm
joiners were more equally distributed across sectors, this could potentially go a long
way to explaining the diﬀerences that we ﬁnd. Judging from the evidence in Table
2, however, there are no major diﬀerences between the distributions of observations
across sectors for diﬀerent worker groups. Within all groups, the three main desti-
nation sectors are “Technical services”, “IT & telecom”, and “Chemicals”. Together,
these three sectors account for around 60 percent of all observations. Although there
is a slight over–representation of joiners from university research in “Chemicals”, it is
far from being dominant in our sample and rather unlikely to explain the diﬀerences
that we observe.
7 Managerial implications
Our estimation results show that labor mobility is an important source of innovative
activity. In particular, we show that the largest gains to innovation are attributable to
joiners from university research, workers with a science degree who have worked at a
university after graduation. Hiring such workers goes hand in hand with a substantial
increase in the number of patents applied for, at least compared to hiring any other
type of worker we consider.
In this way, we show that the transfer of knowledge between universities and ﬁrms
does not work through formal research cooperations and joint research projects only,
as has been extensively studied in the literature up to now. Indeed, the public–private
transfer of knowledge goes beyond such agreements, as the mobility of university
researchers and recent graduates has an economically sizeable and statistically highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the innovative activity of private ﬁrms.
Joiners from university research and graduates have an advantage over ﬁrm joiners
and stayers in terms of scientiﬁc human capital and their ability to augment and re–
combine their superior scientiﬁc human capital with the more applied technical human
capital of workers employed at private sector ﬁrms. These positive factors outweigh
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their relative disadvantage in technical human capital compared to ﬁrm joiners and
stayers. The econometric evidence we provide shows that the balance between the pros
and cons of hiring individuals with a public research background is positive. Both
recent graduates and joiners from university research contribute more to patenting
activity than do workers who have been with a ﬁrm for more than one year.
By contrast, the contribution of R&D stayers is small in both absolute and rela-
tive terms, which suggests that ﬁrms need to devise strategies to keep their stock of
workers up to date regarding recent developments in science and engineering. These
strategies could comprise leave schemes and exchange programs between academia
and the private sector, workshops that bring together academia and business, as well
as other initiatives that facilitate the exchange of knowledge between academia and
industry.
The need for such strategies is underscored by our ﬁnding that even the contribution
of joiners from university research starts to decay fairly rapidly. Our estimation results
suggest that even though they remain positive and substantial, the contributions of
the diﬀerent types of mobile and immobile workers already start to decrease just two
years after they have been hired.
Obviously, hiring workers from academia also helps to mitigate the adverse eﬀects
of knowledge decay. The new hires are likely to transfer their tacit and codiﬁed
knowledge to fellow workers, who thereby move their stock of scientiﬁc and technical
human capital closer to the current knowledge frontier. The interchange of established
and new workers may in fact improve the productivity of the new hires as well since
there may be complementarities between both types of workers — the productivity of
new hires increases in the number of workers with experience in the ﬁrm and vice versa.
Such complementarities may also explain why there is not even more mobility among
scientists — despite our ﬁnding that the direct contribution to patenting activity of
stayers is much lower than that of mobile workers. This issue relates to the presence
of “endogenous absorptive capacity” (Arora and Gambardella 1990, 1994; Cockburn
and Henderson 1998; Cohen and Levinthal 1989, 1990; Fabrizio 2009; Gambardella
1992; Hussinger 2010; Veugelers 1997; Zahra and George 2002), a topic we leave for
further research. We expect absorptive capacity to be present in our context since
labor mobility should have been even higher if this were not an issue. If it existed it
would, however, downward bias our estimated marginal eﬀects for any type of worker
compared to stayers.
A ﬁnal issue relevant for the management of innovation is that hiring university
researchers and recent graduates is associated with substantially lower wage costs than
hiring workers from other private sector ﬁrms. Taking our estimates at face value and
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combining them with median annual earnings for the diﬀerent types of R&D workers
suggests that the cheapest way of boosting innovative activity is to hire university
researchers. For the average ﬁrm, it takes eleven joiners from university research
to generate one additional (citations-weighted) patent application. The total annual
earnings of these workers is 4.1 mio. DKK on average. By contrast, generating one
additional patent by hiring ﬁrm joiners costs 10.7 mio. DKK for the average ﬁrm.
These ﬁgures are substantially smaller for ﬁrms with pre–sample patents. For these
ﬁrms it takes ﬁve joiners from university research or eleven ﬁrm joiners to produce
one additional patent application. The related labor costs are 1.7 mio. DKK and 4.5
mio. DKK, respectively.
How do these labor costs relate to patent value? Using data from the Danish
part of the European “PatVal” survey, Kaiser (2006) documents that 60.8 percent
of the patents are evaluated as being worth more than 0.8 mio. DKK by their own
inventors. As many as 42.7 percent of the patents in the Danish PatVal data are worth
more than 2.3 mio. DKK and 28.1 percent are valued at more than 7.6 mio. DKK.
Comparing these value estimates to the associated costs of generating a patentable
invention through hirings suggests that investing in human capital may indeed be
worthwhile, in particular for ﬁrms with prior patenting experience.
8 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the relative contribution that recent graduates and joiners from
university research make to the innovative activity of the private ﬁrms they join after
their spell in academia. Our research hence looks at a mechanism of knowledge transfer
between universities and the private sector that goes beyond formal public–private
cooperations that the literature has studied so well. We also add to the literature on
labor mobility by investigating a new type of mobility, namely that between academia
and industry.
We use the population of Danish ﬁrms — 5,714 ﬁrms observed over a period of ﬁve
years — that employ R&D workers to link the impact that diﬀerent types of labor
have on the number of annual patent applications at the European Patent Oﬃce.
Our econometric analysis accounts for unobserved time–invariant heterogeneity (“ﬁxed
eﬀects”) and the eﬀects of past patenting on present patenting (“state dependence”).
Our point of departure is a theoretical framework where we balance diﬀerences in
scientiﬁc and technical human capital, access to and type of professional networks and
an individual’s ability to augment her human capital through moving to a diﬀerent
working environment.
We show that joiners from university research contribute most substantially to the
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patenting activity of the ﬁrm they join. Hiring four additional joiners from university
research is associated with one additional (citations-weighted) patent application on
average across ﬁrms with previous patenting activity. Recent university graduates and
workers hired from other ﬁrms also make substantial contributions. One additional
worker of either type increases the number of patents by 0.1 per year. By contrast, the
contribution of immobile workers is small. The latter ﬁnding, in combination with our
result that the impact of any type of worker on patenting activity decays fairly rapidly,
suggests a scope for innovation management practices that helps research workers to
stay on top of the recent developments in science and engineering.
The fact that joiners from university research and recent graduates receive consid-
erably lower wage rates than workers hired from ﬁrms implies that hiring individuals
formerly employed in academia may actually be a cost-eﬀective way of boosting a
ﬁrm’s own innovative performance.
This research has ignored potential complementarities between diﬀerent types of
labor. It may well be true that the contribution of recent graduates and joiners from
university research increases in the number of workers already employed in the ﬁrm.
We leave that question for further research.
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Figure 1: Hypotheses derivation
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Figure 1 visualizes our three hypotheses and characterizes the four diﬀerent types of workers we consider.
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Figure 2: Years elapsed since graduation for university joiners
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Figure 2 shows how the observed movers from university employment to the private sector are distributed by years
since graduation. Reading example: 8.5 percent of moves happen more than 15 years after graduation.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on ﬁrms
All Without With
observations pre–sample patents pre–sample patents
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Dependent variable
# patent appl. t 0.153 1.824 0.034 0.873 1.143 4.846
# patent appl. t citation weighted 0.294 4.375 0.060 1.653 2.239 12.282
Dummy patent t− 1 0.039 — 0.010 — 0.284 —
R&D worker shares
Share stayers 0.631 0.416 0.631 0.422 0.637 0.361
Share joiners from ﬁrms 0.115 0.267 0.117 0.272 0.101 0.218
Share joiners from university research 0.008 0.072 0.008 0.073 0.012 0.065
Share graduates 0.040 0.160 0.041 0.165 0.035 0.113
Share other joiners 0.044 0.178 0.046 0.184 0.023 0.111
Share support 0.161 0.331 0.157 0.332 0.192 0.318
Capital and R&D labor
Capital stock (in mio. DKK) 170 2,040 118 1,860 596 3,140
Total R&D workers 6.594 33.047 4.821 18.502 21.282 84.045
Year dummies
2000 0.214 — 0.214 — 0.218 —
2001 0.199 — 0.199 — 0.206 —
2002 0.202 — 0.202 — 0.202 —
2003 0.195 — 0.195 — 0.194 —
2004 0.190 — 0.191 — 0.181 —
Sector dummies
Farm & food 0.024 — 0.024 — 0.026 —
Textiles & paper 0.030 — 0.030 — 0.031 —
Chemicals 0.024 — 0.018 — 0.071 —
Plastic & glass 0.019 — 0.012 — 0.069 —
Metals 0.021 — 0.018 — 0.051 —
Machinery 0.042 — 0.025 — 0.190 —
Electronics 0.030 — 0.024 — 0.079 —
Instruments 0.025 — 0.018 — 0.081 —
Gross & retail trade 0.196 — 0.209 — 0.088 —
Vehicles 0.005 — 0.004 — 0.017 —
Furniture 0.012 — 0.011 — 0.018 —
IT & telecom 0.121 — 0.131 — 0.046 —
Technical services 0.249 — 0.258 — 0.172 —
Business–related services 0.137 — 0.149 — 0.039 —
Other 0.065 — 0.070 — 0.025 —
Region dummies
Capital 0.529 — 0.536 — 0.471 —
Zealand 0.081 — 0.082 — 0.072 —
Southern 0.145 — 0.141 — 0.181 —
Central 0.172 — 0.171 — 0.176 —
Northern 0.073 — 0.070 — 0.099 —
Pre–sample variables
100 times # pre–sample patents 0.018 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.157 0.846
Dummy pre–sample patents 0.108 — 0.000 — 1.000 —
# observations 16,531 14,750 1,781
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the entire set of observations, for observations on ﬁrms with a pre–sample
patent and for those without a pre–sample patent. “SD” denotes the respective standard deviation.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for R&D workers
Joiners Joiners Recent Other Stayers
from ﬁrms from univ. research graduates Joiners
Number of Observations 10,363 934 4,354 3,055 76,770
Age (Years)
10th percentile 29.0 28.0 25.0 29.0 30.0
Median 36.0 32.0 28.0 36.0 39.0
Mean 37.6 34.2 28.8 38.4 40.8
90th percentile 49.0 44.0 34.0 52.0 55.0
Time Since Graduation (Years)
10th percentile 2.0 1.0 0.0 2.0 3.0
Median 7.0 3.0 0.0 7.0 11.0
Mean 9.7 5.5 0.3 9.9 13.1
90th percentile 21.0 13.0 1.0 23.0 28.0
Formal Qualiﬁcations (Percent)
Master’s level 91.1 64.5 87.9 92.7 90.0
Ph.D. level 8.9 35.5 12.1 7.3 10.0
Sectoral Distribution (Percent)
Farm & food 1.8 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.5
Textiles & paper 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.9 1.2
Chemicals 16.0 22.1 15.7 13.0 15.9
Plastic & glass 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.3
Metals 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6
Machinery 2.6 3.6 4.2 2.8 4.0
Electronics 3.3 3.9 3.8 2.5 2.8
Instruments 2.8 4.0 2.8 1.8 2.9
Gross & retail trade 10.5 6.4 9.3 10.1 10.5
Vehicles 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5
Furniture 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4
IT & telecom 17.4 12.5 14.7 13.9 14.1
Technical services 29.3 32.1 32.9 32.9 32.9
Business–related services 8.6 5.6 6.4 9.5 5.8
Other 4.0 2.6 4.4 7.1 4.8
Annual earnings (in 1,000 DKK, indexed to the year 2000)
10th percentile 229 265 263 212 317
Median 419 370 323 374 457
Mean 443 377 333 395 482
90th percentile 615 495 419 577 660
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics for our population of R&D workers. The information on individual R&D
workers is aggregated to the respective employer–level for the econometric analysis and for Table 1.
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Table 3: NegBin PSME estimation results
Without Twice
Main citation lagged
Speciﬁcation weights worker shares
Coeﬀ. p–value Coeﬀ. p–value Coeﬀ. p–value
R&D worker shares
Share joiners from ﬁrms 0.822 0.000 0.746 0.000 0.712 0.010
Share joiners from university research 1.959 0.000 1.883 0.000 1.523 0.007
Share recent graduates 0.847 0.007 0.781 0.011 0.813 0.050
Share other joiners 0.267 0.505 0.260 0.510 0.702 0.206
Share support 0.297 0.177 0.276 0.229 0.276 0.276
Capital and R&D labor
ln(total R&D workers) 0.257 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.266 0.000
ln(capital stock) 0.165 0.000 0.166 0.000 0.161 0.000
Lagged dependent and pre–sample variables
Dummy patent t− 1 1.394 0.000 1.425 0.000 1.447 0.000
ln(ﬁxed eﬀect) 0.339 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.313 0.002
Fixed eﬀect dummy 0.222 0.466 0.338 0.166 0.414 0.314
Tests for joint signiﬁcance Test stat. p–value Test stat. p–value Test stat. p–value
Worker shares 31.64 0.000 28.74 0.000 14.20 0.014
Year dummies 5.52 0.238 4.98 0.290 9.24 0.026
Sector dummies 53.97 0.000 57.94 0.000 36.10 0.001
Region dummies 3.57 0.467 4.07 0.397 2.28 0.684
Pre–sample variables 46.90 0.000 35.91 0.000 44.04 0.000
# observations, ﬁrms and patents
# observations 16,531 16,531 10,585
# patents 2,535 2,535 1,982
# patents citations weighted 4,867 4,867 3,912
# ﬁrms 5,714 5,714 3,880
Table 3 displays NegBin PSME regression results for our “main” speciﬁcation that uses patent citation weights,
a speciﬁcation that does not use citation weights and a speciﬁcation that lags worker shares by two instead of one
period. Diﬀerences in the number of patents are due to citation weighting vs. non–weighting. The twice-lagged
speciﬁcation contains fewer observations because we lose one year of data.
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Table 4: Marginal eﬀects
Marginal eﬀects and elasticities across...
...observations ...observations
with at with pre–
least sample
. . . all observations one patent patents
ME p–value ME p–value ME p–value
Marginal eﬀects
Joiners from ﬁrms 0.039 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.093 0.000
Joiners from university research 0.090 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.212 0.000
Recent graduates 0.040 0.002 0.119 0.003 0.095 0.002
Other Joiners 0.014 0.404 0.041 0.429 0.034 0.407
Support 0.016 0.074 0.045 0.078 0.037 0.063
Stayers 0.002 0.455 0.006 0.562 0.006 0.414
Table 4 displays marginal eﬀects for diﬀerent types of workers and across alternative types of ﬁrms. It is based on
the estimation results presented as the main speciﬁcation in Table 3. Marginal eﬀects are evaluated at the means
of the involved variables. Reading example: across all observations, one additional ﬁrm joiner is related to 0.039
additional patents.
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Appendix A: Correlation matrix
Lag J. from J. from J.
patent ﬁrms univ other Grad.
Dummy patent t− 1 1
Joiners from ﬁrms 0.0059 1
Joiners from universities 0.0271 -0.025 1
Other joiners -0.0221 -0.076 -0.020 1
Recent graduates 0.0099 -0.068 -0.001 -0.039 1
Support -0.0017 -0.162 -0.045 -0.101 -0.103
ln(total R&D workers) 0.267 -0.029 0.004 -0.062 0.003
ln(cap. stock) 0.2066 -0.010 -0.019 -0.061 -0.042
ln(ﬁxed eﬀect) 0.5242 -0.016 -0.016 -0.036 -0.008
Fixed eﬀect dummy 0.4375 -0.018 -0.018 -0.040 -0.013
ln(total R&D FE
Supp. workers) ln(cap. stock) ln(FE) dummy
Support 1
ln(total R&D workers) -0.029 1
ln(cap. stock) 0.168 0.168 1
ln(FE) 0.017 0.017 0.295 1
FE dummy 0.033 0.033 0.284 0.924 1
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Appendix B: Patent production function derivation
This appendix derives the basic patent production function, Equation (1). Recall that
R&D employment is divided into the following six types of labor:
L = LS + LJ + LU + LO + LG + LP ⇔ LS = L− LJ − LU − LO − LG − LP .
The Cobb-Douglas patent production function can be written as:
P = exp (ln (A) + β ln (K) + α ln (QL)),
where A is a vector of ﬁxed eﬀects proxies, state dependence terms, time, region and
industry eﬀects which are discussed in Section 4.2, K denotes capital and QL is the
measure of R&D labor input in eﬃciency units (normalizing the marginal productivity
of stayers):
QL = LS + γJLJ + γULU + γOLO + γGLG + γPLP .
To be able to apply a Cobb-Douglas function without forcing output to zero for many
ﬁrms, we need to assume perfect substitution between the diﬀerent types of labor
input as shown by the additive separability of the labor types. As long as we assume
separability between a relative homogenous set of labor inputs, R&D employment in
our context, we consider this to be a reasonable assumption.
The quality-adjusted labor input can be rewritten as:
QL = LS + γJLJ + γULU + γOLO + γGLG + γPLP
= L− LJ − LU − LO − LG − LP + γJLJ + γULU + γOLO + γGLG + γPLP
= L+ (γJ − 1)LJ + (γU − 1)LU + (γO − 1)LO + (γG − 1)LG + (γP − 1)LP
= L
(
1 + (γJ − 1) LJ
L
+ (γU − 1) LU
L
+ (γO − 1) LO
L
+ (γG − 1) LG
L
+ (γP − 1) LP
L
)
.
Using the approximation ln(1 + x) ≈ x for small x and taking logarithm yields:
lnQL = ln (L)+(γJ − 1) LJL +(γU − 1) LUL +(γO − 1) LOL +(γG − 1) LGL +(γP − 1) LPL .
Inserting QL into the production function and deﬁning δk = α(γk − 1) leads to:
P = exp
[
ln (A) + β ln (K) + α ln (L)
+α
(
(γJ − 1) LJ
L
+ (γU − 1) LU
L
+ (γO − 1) LO
L
+ (γG − 1) LG
L
+ (γP − 1) LP
L
)]
= exp
[
ln (A) + β ln (K) + α ln (L) + δJ
LJ
L
+ δU
LU
L
+δO
LO
L
+ δG
LG
L
+ δP
LP
L
]
. (2)
which corresponds to (1).
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Appendix C: Calculating marginal eﬀects
This appendix derives the marginal eﬀects for the main labor types. The marginal
eﬀects do not follow directly from the estimation results because of the non-linear
model we apply and because each labor type enters through the total number of R&D
workers and through the labor share variables. The absolute change in the number of
patent applications (weighted by citations) by adding one additional worker of a type
LJ is found by diﬀerentiating the expected number of patents (Equation (1)):
∂E [P ]
∂LJ
= P̂
[
α
1
L
+
δJL− δJLJ
L2
− δULU
L2
− δOLO
L2
− δGLG
L2
− δPLP
L2
]
=
P̂
L
[
α+ δJ − δJLJ
L
− δULU
L
− δOLO
L
− δGLG
L
− δPLP
L
]
,
P̂ denotes predicted values which are evaluated in mean values. The corresponding
marginal eﬀects for the remaining types follow easily.
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